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ral Histories represent the recol-
lections and opinions of the person
interviewed, and not the official
position ofMORS. Omissions and errors in
fact are correctedwhen possible, but every
effort is made to present the interviewee’s
own words.
Dr. Alfred George Brandstein (AlGeBra)
brings more than a clever signature to the
practice of military operations research.
His accomplishments in studying the
MV-22, the creation of Project Albert, and
the founding of the field of Operational
Synthesis are evidence of his unsurpassed
leadership and contributions to the field.
But his real hallmarks are a troika of charac-
teristics blended in a way that are legendary,
at least within Marine Corps circles. The
first is audacity: he strives to answer ques-
tions others would not even dare to ask.
The second is humility: his actions are
a testament to the tenet that you can ac-
complish much if you don’t care who gets
the credit. The third needs no example
and indeed summarizes the man himself:
integrity.
Dr. Brandstein holds a Bachelor of Sci-
ence degree from Brooklyn College, with
majors in Physics, Mathematics, and As-
tronomy, and a Ph.D. in Mathematics
from Brown University. Dr. Brandstein
joined U.S. Army’s Harry Diamond Labo-
ratories in 1972. He became a member of
the Marine Corps family in 1980, when
he joined the Analysis Support Branch
of the Marine Corps Development Cen-
ter. During Desert Shield/Desert Storm
he was Director of the Marine Corps Op-
erations Analysis and Assessment Group
(MCOAAG). He eventually became Chief
Analyst, a Senior Level (Senior Executive
Service [SES]-4 equivalent) position, at
the Marine Corps Combat Development
Command (MCCDC) and the Director of
Project Albert for the Marine Corps War-
fighting Laboratory.
Dr. Brandstein, who has authored sev-
eral hundred professional papers, is a re-
cipient of the Army Development and
Readiness Command (DARCOM) Systems
Analysis Award, the Marine Corps Meri-
torious Civilian Service Award and the
Superior Civilian Service Award. In 2000,
Dr. Brandstein became the winner of the
MORS Clayton Thomas Award.
MORS ORAL HISTORY
Interview with Dr. Alfred Brandstein
October 20, 2004
Woodbridge, Virginia
Cortez D. ‘‘Steve’’ Stephens and Major John
Bruggeman, Interviewers
Steve Stephens: Dr. Brandstein, please
tell us where were you born.
Al Brandstein: Brooklyn, New York,
October 1938.
Steve Stephens: Tell us about your family.
Al Brandstein: My father was a doctor;
my mother ran a bookstore, and I have one
sister who is eight years younger. I grew up
in Bensonhurst in Brooklyn, and my father
went off to World War II. When he came
back, we moved to Sheepshead Bay, also
in Brooklyn, and Iwent to elementary school,
high school, and college there. I went to
Brooklyn College, which was two bus stops
further on than the high school.
Steve Stephens:Dr. Harris was also raised
in Brooklyn. [Note: Dr. Carl M. Harris was
Professor of Operations Research at George
Mason University. In 1999, Dr. Harris won
the INFORMS George E. Kimball Medal,
in recognition of his many years of distin-
guished service to the OR profession.]
Al Brandstein: A lot of people were
raised in Brooklyn. I think Brooklyn has
produced more mathematics PhDs than
any other place—and Brooklyn College,
specifically.
Steve Stephens: How far did you go
at Brooklyn College—all the way to the
PhD?
Al Brandstein: No, not at Brooklyn Col-
lege. I didn’t know what to do after college
was coming to an end; the thought of work
was an effort. So I decided to go wherever
they’d give me the most money and Brown
won out. Brown and math won out by $50
a year over Cornell and physics and by
$100 over Michigan and astronomy.
Steve Stephens: That was your measure
of effectiveness?
Al Brandstein: I didn’t know what else
to do. I was a naive little kid. I didn’t know
what I was going to do except I knew I
didn’t want to work.
Steve Stephens: Can I back up a little bit?
You went to public schools in Brooklyn.
Then you went to a public high school?
Al Brandstein: Yes, the high schools, at
least the one I went to, were a little bit dif-
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advantage of being as far away as possible from
the Bronx High School of Science and still be in
New York City.
Steve Stephens: The advantage of being far
away from it?
Al Brandstein: Yes. If you wanted to have
a really good education and not spend half your
life on the subway, you went to my high school
instead of going to the BronxHigh School of Sci-
ence. I’m told that our graduating class turned
out 350 MDs.
Steve Stephens: Was it a large class?
Al Brandstein: About 1,600.
Steve Stephens: The name of the school?
Al Brandstein: James Madison. Our math
team competitions were better attended than
the football games and in the year I graduated
we had a first and second in the Westinghouse
talent search.
Steve Stephens: So in high school your love
was for mathematics.
Al Brandstein: Yes. High school math then
was very different from today’s high school
math. There was no concept of having calculus
in high school. What we did have were subjects
that you don’t take any more. For example,
higher algebra that deals with difference equa-
tions and the binomial theorem with arbitrary
exponents. There was spherical trigonometry
and solid geometry. I do not see those subjects
in high school anymore.
Steve Stephens:How did you choose Brooklyn
College?
Al Brandstein: It was easy; it was just two
bus stops further on than the high school. An-
other reason was it was $8 a semester for tuition
and I had a $350 a semester scholarship. And I
was socially immature—the thought of going
away to college never occurred to me and all
my friends went there. Another interesting
point is that in junior high school, all my friends
and I skipped the 8th grade.
Steve Stephens: You ran with a fast pack.
Al Brandstein: I ended up with a severe infe-
riority complex. I remember taking algebra in
7th grade and everybody on all sides of me
was studying differential equations. They were
very—I guess fast would be the case.
Steve Stephens: And your major in college?
Al Brandstein: Physics, math, and astron-
omy—all three.
Steve Stephens: Three separate majors
or was there one major that combined the
three?
Al Brandstein: No, three separate majors.
The thing I disliked about Brooklyn College was
that it was the largest liberal arts college in the
world at the time and they made you take a
lot of liberal arts, so I didn’t get to take as many
hard science credits as I wanted to. I went to
summer school to gain more credit. I ended
up with 40 credits in physics, 36 in math, and
20 in astronomy.
Steve Stephens: When you were at Brooklyn
College, did you have a preference between
the three?
Al Brandstein: No I liked them all except
I became a little disillusioned about physics.
When we took quantum mechanics, I didn’t
like the idea that electrons could go from one
place to another and get to the second place be-
fore they left the first. I decided that if that’s the
way the world is, I don’t want to live in it. But
then, if Cornell had offered $50 more I would
have been a physicist.
Steve Stephens: So there you were, majoring
in physics, astronomy, and mathematics. And
you went directly to Brown; you didn’t go into
industry or military service?
Al Brandstein: I was fortunate enough to go
to graduate school right after Brooklyn College.
At that time, the government was desperate
to get scientists because of Sputnik. The only
criteria that they had were aptitude tests like
the Graduate Record Exam and I do well on
aptitude tests but not on achievement tests.
Our standard of living in graduate school was
high. You have heard of poor starving graduate
students—that was not the case. [Note: On
4 October 1957, the Soviet Union successfully
launched Sputnik I. Sputnik was the world’s
first artificial satellite and was about the size
of a basketball. That Sputnik launch marked
the start of the space age and the US-USSR
space race. Source: http://history.nasa.gov/
sputnik]
Steve Stephens: Did you consider medical
school?
Al Brandstein:My father talked me out of it.
He was a physician and he hated his lifestyle.
That’s the primary reason—he was very un-
happy with it.
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Steve Stephens:How longwere you at Brown?
Al Brandstein: I’m ashamed to say—13 years.
In part, it was because I’m a slow learner, but
also in part because the money was so nice.
For the last seven years there I was also an assis-
tant professor at the University of Connecticut.
I taught all the undergraduate math courses
and some graduate courses. I had a bunch of
students.
Steve Stephens: What was your specialty as
you went for your PhD?
Al Brandstein: It becomes interesting later
on, it’s a field called functional analysis. It’s us-
ing the techniques from one major discipline
say, algebra, geometry, or calculus to do prob-
lems in another discipline. For example, you
take a geometric problem and see if you can con-
vert it into a continuous problem, solve that and
then go back into the geometric domain or go
into an algebraic domain. My thesis was on
Swiss cheeses, I actually have a theorem that
sometimes gets quoted. It is concerned with fi-
nitely generated, antisymmetric algebras and
their deficiencies. I was able to show that every
two manifold is a maximum ideal space of an al-
gebra of arbitrary deficiency. I’m sure it doesn’t
mean anything to the world at large but the only
ones known at the time were the real projective
plane and the sphere.
Steve Stephens: When you were at Brown,
did you ever come across the term operations
research or operational research?
Al Brandstein: Never!
Steve Stephens:Was the term ‘‘applied math-
ematics’’ in vogue?
Al Brandstein: Applied math was certainly
in vogue. Brown is very famous for its applied
math department, its computer science depart-
ment, and history of math. But in my day, if
you committed computer you were drummed
out of the math department.
Steve Stephens: I have never heard that term
before, ‘‘committed computer.’’
Al Brandstein: If you used the computer,
they stripped off your buttons and sent you over
to computer science or applied math.
Steve Stephens: Applied math and computer
science were looked at in unfavorable terms?
Al Brandstein: No. The criterion for getting
a PhD in math at the time was aesthetics, how
beautiful your theorems were. It turned out a
couple of mine were appealing, I suppose. I’d
only had one computer course in my life going
back to Brooklyn College. It was, maybe, 1958
and the course was on a Univac I. Univac I was
before the days of assemblers and compilers.
You had to write in machine language and a lot
of people hated it. I liked it.
Steve Stephens: I’m going to ask you to go
back and explain the significance of Sputnik.
Al Brandstein: At the time, I was part of the
Moon Watch Program, which was supposed to
look for the Navy’s satellite, Vanguard, the one
that kept falling over on its face. When Sputnik
went up, it was quite a surprise. NBC let us use
the roof on the RCA building to watch for it.
We had set up these telescopes. But that’s not
the question you’re asking, just an interesting
sidelight.
The country was very desperate about the
science, engineering, and math gap that ap-
parently the Sputnik seemed to point out. So
the government threw millions, maybe billions
of dollars into trying to get people to go into sci-
ence. I had a National Science Foundation Fel-
lowship that came out of the Sputnik fallout.
You qualified for it by taking the Graduate Re-
cord Exam. As I said, I do quite well on apti-
tude tests. So I got a high score and came out
with lots of money. I kept that fellowship for
the whole time I was in graduate school. I had
that plus I had the salary as an assistant profes-
sor. You can’t beat that. By my first year in grad-
uate school I had saved enough money to buy
a new car and a mink coat for my wife.
Steve Stephens: When did you marry? Did
you meet while you were at Brooklyn College?
Al Brandstein:No, it was later. I was teaching
astronomy at a camp in the Adirondacks—one
of those rich kid camps. Donna was teaching
flute and drama.Wemet up there in Lake Placid.
It was 1961; we got married in 1962. They even
gave me a honeymoon fellowship. If you’re get-
ting married during the summer they gave you
a fellowship to cover that.
Steve Stephens: Where did you go on the
honeymoon fellowship?
Al Brandstein: Miami, on the recommenda-
tion of my father-in-law.
Steve Stephens:When you left Brown, where
did you go next?
Al Brandstein:Harry Diamond Laboratories.
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Steve Stephens: Where is Harry Diamond
Laboratories?
Al Brandstein: There were ten of them. Nine
of them were in Maryland. At the time they
were on upper Connecticut Avenue. The tenth
was located here in Woodbridge. That’s why
we moved to Woodbridge.
Steve Stephens: How did you become in-
volved with Harry Diamond Laboratories?
Al Brandstein: Iwas at someparty atmy sister-
in-law’s house in Alexandria. She has an office
still in Woodbridge; she’s a plastic surgeon. So
she had a graduation party, I think it was for a
medical school or internship, and I ran into a
next-door neighbor who happened to be a GS-17
or GS-18. They didn’t have SESs at the time. We
got to talking and she said, ‘‘Send me a resume,’’
so I did. Lo and behold, they offered me the job.
Steve Stephens: Describe the type of organi-
zation that Harry Diamond Laboratories was.
Al Brandstein: I can’t describe the whole
thing, but Harry Diamond, if the myth is right,
is the one who discovered proximity fuses.
The Harry Diamond Lab here in Woodbridge
did electromagnetic pulse (EMP) work. [Note:
Harry Diamond was born in Russia on 12
February 1900 and immigrated to the U.S. as
a child. Through his vast knowledge in the
field of electronics, he contributed greatly to the
fundamental concept and design of proximity
fuses. Source: http://www.goordnance.army.
mil/hof/1969/diamond.html]
Steve Stephens: This was a government
organization?
Al Brandstein: Yes, US Army.
Steve Stephens: So you left Brown and be-
came a civil servant.
Al Brandstein: Right. It turns out that every
self-respecting lab has a slot for a mathemati-
cian, but they didn’t have the slightest idea what
to do with one. I worked in a group with three
physicists who were also superfluous but it
was felt that a lab needed physicists and this
was a lab. The first thing I did there was to write,
with one of the physicists, a paper on Fourier
transforms. We came up with a scheme to do
more accurate approximations to functions and
then use an advanced Fourier algorithm to eval-
uate the transform event.
Steve Stephens:What type of automated com-
puter support did you have to do that?
Al Brandstein: We had a thing called a
Mohawk. It was in a room about the size of this
one, maybe 20 by 30 feet. It was filled with com-
puters with tape drives and a card reader. It was
a card-based operating system. The only purpose
of this thing was to act as a portal to get us to the
CDC6600 at the David Taylor Model Basin in
Carderock, Maryland. So you needed all of that
just to get there and it took all day or half a day
to get started. You used card decks. I am not very
neat and I dropped them half the time. You put
card decks into the card reader and it would go
on tape and that would be sped over the phone
lines at 100 baud or something like that to Car-
derock. After about a week you would get back
the results. It would take a week because the
first 10 times they would find a card out of or-
der. That’s the computer support we had.
Three or four years laterwe also got a PDP11,
althoughmemorywas very limited. If you put in
the FORTRAN compiler you had 10words left to
do the program. FORTRAN was not the ideal
thing for working on a PDP.
Luckily, with our Fourier transforms, it was
mainly a theoretical thing.We did awhole bunch
of calculations to compare our transforms with
other people’s transforms and for thatweneeded
a computer. Most of the work was theoretical,
however. I had to construct this algorithm, de-
scribe how to construct it and explain why it
was better or worse. We then did comparisons
with some analytical functions that approxi-
mated electromagnetic pulse. That was, I think,
the first thing I did there.
Steve Stephens:Was there verymuch of a cul-
ture shock moving from the Northeast to what
was then considered the South?
Al Brandstein: Yes, everything in the neigh-
borhood. How we came to love this area is a to-
tally different story. In those days, college prep
courses were not allowed in Woodbridge high
schools. Advanced placement was not allowed
and when my son got to high school age I inad-
vertently became head of the Parent Teacher As-
sociation at the local high school. Being naı¨ve,
I went to the first meeting and had to leave early
so I signed up for the library committee. I was the
only one signed up for anything and I couldn’t
get rid of it so I was President for 12 years or
so. But that gaveme a lot of influence andwe feel
that was part of turning around the county.
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Steve Stephens: Prince William County?
Al Brandstein:Yes, it’s PrinceWilliamCounty
and the high school is Woodbridge High School.
In part the influence is because my son is a little
different. He completed all the work for a mas-
ter’s in mathematics while he was still in high
school. So, all in all, there wasn’t that much
of a culture shock. Within the environment at
the Harry Diamond Lab, for the four physi-
cists and me there was nothing for us to do ex-
cept what we felt like doing. Actually, that’s
not really correct.
Steve Stephens: What happened to the lab?
Al Brandstein: The neighbors complained
about the pulses being set off there, but actually
I think it’s because people wanted the land for
something else. My boss said worrying about
EMP is like worrying about the outbreak of pso-
riasis on a patient that’s dying of cancer.
Steve Stephens: How long were you at the
Harry Diamond Labs?
Al Brandstein: From 1972 to 1980. I’ll tell you
a story about how I left. In the mornings, we
would have public affairs talks. Someonewould
go over what was in the newspaper and we’d
have a book review. To keep busy, we would
try to learn a computer language a week. Now
these were very smart people. Then we came
across GPSS, General Purpose Simulation Sys-
tem and it looked like that could be used to do
things that might be beneficial to the lab, just
in case somebody would check on us and won-
derwhywewere there. Sowe learnedGPSS and
then we developed models of communication
systems, specifically the nuclear release chain
in Europe, AUTOVON and AUTODIN2. [Note:
Developed in the 1960s, AUTOVON (Auto-
matic Voice Network) was designed to carry
DoD mission-critical and administrative voice
traffic. AUTODIN (Automatic Digital Network)
was also developed in the mid-1960s and han-
dled military record communications and com-
munications support for special intelligence
communities.]
Steve Stephens: You simulated this?
Al Brandstein:Yes. GPSS, which is still around
is an ideal system for doing that. I don’t think
anything has improved on it. Actually, it’s an
agent-based modeling approach, but that’s for
later. Harry Diamond was a corporate lab—
corporate lab meaning that they were funded
by other government agencies. So we actually
got in the money from the Defense Communi-
cation Agency and Defense Nuclear Agency.
AUTODIN2 was a concept and I’m not sure that
we were totally responsible for it, but we played
a role in it never coming to be. The reason being
that it would work fine—the way we modeled
it—it worked fine under normal conditions, but
under stress it all fell apart.
For a while, I was employed at Harry
Diamond as an electronics engineer, even
though I had no background for it obviously.
We had developed the largest transportable
EMP simulator. Transportable is really stretching
it—it took 25 tractor-trailers to move it. We were
going to test an AUTOVON Switch that was at
Polk City, Florida, so ours was brought down
there. I was the one who installed the oscillo-
scope and probes and I installed things in the
switch. I didn’t know what I was doing but it
was fun. And I got to play with a flash override
on the telephones. The interesting part of this
was that it was going to be used for the first
time. We had a bunch of colonels and generals
down inside this bombproof building to com-
memorate the inauguration of the thing.
I got bored with the talks and went outside
in time to see a tornado come along and destroy
the whole apparatus!
A little bit more to the story, however. We
decided there was no point in staying there, so
we went to Tampa for lunch. Meanwhile, my
wife got a call that there’s been a tornado and
no sign of her husband. She calls the state police
andNationalGuard and everybody is in a panic.
Just incidentally I called from lunch to tell her I
was there. Now the story of why I left.
Harry Diamond Laboratories decided that
salaries were too high. Being a government
lab, they did something, I don’t know if they still
can do it, but it’s something called, ‘‘Man in the
job-jobs.’’ This meant that you got a permanent
grade of say, GS11—I think I was about a 13 at
the time. They then brought in a panel that eval-
uated you depending on how productive you’d
been over the last few years. That determined
your salary for the next few years.
Being a typical bureaucracy, we had to close
down the place for six months and fill out the
paperwork. They spent an inordinate amount
of money bringing in those experts from outside.
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Fortunately for me, on the panel there were two
people in my field in math. I was still publishing
some papers on that stuff. So they evaluated me
between 16 and 17. If it had been a different
group of evaluators I would have been rated
a 9. This raised my consciousness about myself.
Meanwhile the lab discovered that, instead of
reducing costs, ‘‘Man in the job-jobs’’ were going
to raise costs.
The same thing happened with the physi-
cists in my group. So we all left as soon as we
could. I saw an ad in the Potomac News, that’s
the Prince William newspaper, for the job down
in Quantico. It had the words ‘‘operational anal-
ysis’’ and I thought that it had to do with my
kind of analysis. By the way, in the course of
working at Harry Diamond, I became involved
with the Military Operations Research Society
(MORS). That’s where I heard about operations
research (OR). Except for the last two years, I’ve
been to every MORS Symposium and plenary
session since 1972.
Steve Stephens: Your association with MORS
began in Harry Diamond Labs?
Al Brandstein: I felt the computer simula-
tions we did were somehow related to opera-
tions research.
Steve Stephens: How did you come to join
MORS? Did you pick up a copy of PHALANX?
Al Brandstein: No, it was a way to get out of
town. Somebody in the office had heard of this
society and that they had thesemeetings.MORS
wasmeeting twice a year then. So I was going to
MORS Symposia. I could always give some sort
of paper or other.
Steve Stephens: At that time, if somebody
from the Washington Post or New York Times
interviewed you, would you describe yourself
as an operations research analyst?
Al Brandstein: No, I didn’t take on that ap-
pellation. Just like you were an officer and a
gentleman by act of Congress; that was your
appellation. I didn’t take that on until I got
to the Marine Corps.
Steve Stephens: What happened when you
arrived at Quantico?
Al Brandstein: It was then called the Systems
Analysis Branch. Lieutenant Colonel John Short
had just started it and it somehow had moved
down from headquarters. There were a couple
of majors and me. We were the analytic arm of
theMarine Corps.We had no ideawhat it meant
but at least now we’re in the realm of analysis.
John was a cost analyst and we had one major
who was an OR analyst.
Steve Stephens: So the Marine Corps had
established an operations research military oc-
cupational specialty at that time?
Al Brandstein: To the best of my knowledge.
I didn’t knowmuch aboutmilitary occupational
specialties and things like that. They set up this
branch; there were two or three people in it. And
the first thing I did was evaluate the ARMVAL
(Advanced Anti-armor Vehicle Evaluation). Do
you know what that is?
Steve Stephens: Yes, most definitely, out in
California at Fort Hunter Liggett. Dick Wiles
was out in California at that time and was in-
volved in ARMVAL. He was a Colonel in the
Army then. [Note: COL Richard I. Wiles, FS, is
MORS Executive Vice President Emeritus.]
Al Brandstein: General Al Gray, at this time
he was in command of Fleet Marine Forces, At-
lantic. General Graywanted these light armored
vehicles. He liked to scoot around the battle-
field. He felt these would be better than tanks
for the Marine Corps and had his mind set on
replacing them. So we set up this experiment
out in California with surrogates in the role of
light armored vehicles. I don’t think there’s been
an experiment the Marine Corps has been in-
volved with even now that was as sophisticated
as this. It was completely instrumented with
lasers simulating vehicles firing at each other.
[Note: General Alfred Gray went on to become
the 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps.]
Steve Stephens: I was in charge of the data
collectors at Fort Hunter Liggett during the
ARMVAL test.
Al Brandstein: Well then it is a small world.
I’m sort of proud of the analysis.When you look
at the results, it obviously seems like the test ef-
fort had been set up with the intent to make the
light armored vehicles come out better. It was
clear when you looked at the design. When
you looked at the data, that was not the case.
The good guys lost. It fell upon me to figure
out why.
Of course there were all these Latin squares
and complicated designs of experiment. Every-
thing was as sophisticated as you can get. The
clue came as I was talking to somebody who
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was out at the experiment. He mentioned that it
rained the weekend before the Marine Corps
Birthday. It turned out that more of the tests
of one sort were done after the rain. The rain,
however, was not recorded because it was on
a weekend. The dust had settled and as a result
the lower sensors on the tanks would respond
to the lasers. Now when you took that into
account—what I did was to go back to the video
tapes and visually counted up each hit. When
you did that right, the good guys won. That
took six months of agony.
Steve Stephens:Now the light armored vehicle
is mobilized around the world in Marine Corps
units.
Al Brandstein:Maybe if I hadn’t fixed it, who
knows. Two or three independent organizations
came to the opposite conclusion.
In those days it became quite clear that my
role down at Quantico was to be something I
call ‘‘defensive analysis.’’ The Marine Corps
could not afford, nor did we want, those huge
models that the other services had, such as
TACWAR and THUNDER. Furthermore, it
was the impression of some, including myself,
that sometimes the purpose of the models was
first to come up with the decision and then
run the models to support that decision.
Defensive analysis, as I use the term, is to
protect the Marine Corps from such shenani-
gans. That part, I think, was about the only thing
I was ever reasonably successful at.
I used to go around giving these talks that
you could learn a lot by taking a look at how
models were used. There are two things I want
to address. The role of models in analysis and
the verification, validation, and accreditation
(VV&A) process.
I could not understand how people could
take the theory that a set of Lanchester equa-
tions could provide answers to questions being
asked of combat models. You have these differ-
ential equations—there is nothing wrong with
the equations, by the way. Yet we use them to
draw conclusions about what sort of equipment
to buy or what sort of force structure to build.
First of all, with these equations we have no
idea what the equations are actually represent-
ing, whether they have some sort of meaning.
They are just broad differential equations. Do
they measure some sort of central tendency?
How do you handle the outliers? How do you
handle the human decisions? The tendency as
the years went by was to make the simulations
more and more detailed. In my mind that made
them less and less useful. The reason being that
you couldn’t possibly run it enough times even
if you could simulate everything which nobody
knew how to do.
This problem with the differential equa-
tions model, I thought, was emphasized when
MORS came out with the PHALANX series of
papers on nonmonotonicity. Maybe I remember
them because they were along my line of think-
ing. So I used to give talks about these defects
and the fact that often the answer was obtained
and then the models were run to substantiate
the answer. We’re supposed to have some ethics.
I had two choices; one was to burn my union
card, and the otherwas to try to fix it. And I spent
the rest of my career, such as it was, in trying to
come up with ways of fixing this nightmare—
make models appropriate for the questions at
hand.
I wondered why OR—I have been wonder-
ing this since 1980—why OR worked in World
War II and it doesn’t seem to have worked since.
And I still questioned until I read a book called
Hunting U-Boats in the Bay of Biscayne. It turns
out that OR, in that instance, was a cover for
cracking the enigma machine. So OR really
didn’t work then either but it was so classified
that nobody knew about it and McNamara
came along and institutionalized it. One of the
greatest frauds in OR is cost and operational ef-
fectiveness analyses (COEAs).
Steve Stephens:Why are the COEAs a fraud?
Al Brandstein: Perhaps ‘‘fraud’’ is too strong
a word because many analysts were well in-
tended. But we had no way of finding out what
the effectiveness was in any meaningful manner,
in my mind. You get samples of what this effec-
tiveness is, but you don’t get the effectiveness.
The effectiveness is going to be based on who is
using it how, what the times were, when this tree
is here or there. By the way, simulations by this
time were taking that into account. If we move
this tree from this location over five feet, it
makes the model sensitive to it. Now if you go
to buy equipment based on that and you don’t
know where that tree is, or even what country
you’re going to be in, how do you use models?
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They were nice models; they were just not suit-
able to answer the questions that I was inter-
ested in.
Somehow, as I rose up through ranks, I got
thrown into these briar patches. Because I was
the only civilian doing this stuff for many years
in the Marine Corps, I became the representa-
tive in places like the Analysis Council.
Steve Stephens: While you were doing this,
how was your relationship with the Center for
Naval Analyses (CNA) Marine Corps Opera-
tions Analysis Group (MCOAG)?
Al Brandstein: My feeling was that they felt
above the fray. If there was no sophisticated ac-
ademic approach to a question, they would not
approach it. For some the attitude was: I’m from
CNA so I know better than you. I became very
friendly with one of them after I convinced
him to leave MCOAG and go someplace else.
They had some hammers and they tried to con-
vert the world into nails so they could use them.
I fought them tooth and nail and I was on some
sort of board that oversaw them—but that didn’t
help too much. There was lots of political influ-
ence on their side.
Another interesting part of it was the com-
bat models; I think they had their place. But
combat models were considered beneath the
dignity of CNA. I won’t mention any names,
but several people have left CNAbecause of that.
So my relationship is not very good, but on the
other hand they were free help. The Department
of the Navy gave us some money; if we didn’t
use CNA we wouldn’t have the money. I have
a lot of respect for some of the people there,
Dr. George Akst, for instance.
A thing youmay bemost interested in is the
MV-22. That is an example of this defensive
analysis. All the analysts in the Office of the Sec-
retary of Defense ProgramAnalysis and Evalua-
tion (PA&E) were dead set against the MV-22.
They ran TACWAR and it showed that the
MV-22 made no contribution whatsoever. Mean-
while, we had lots of friends in Congress who
were eager to pursue this. So I needed to come
up with something that the PA&E bunch could
not find fault with. I didn’t have to show that
the MV-22 came out better all the time, I just
needed to find one instance of where, if you
had the MV-22 you succeeded and if you didn’t
have it you failed. Sowe did it. It waswith Colonel
Ted Smyth. We called it the Root Canal, that’s his
term. Remember this was in the early 1990s.
So we came up with the following technique
that became—although I didn’t know at the
time—the foundation for the stuff I was doing
later. Iwanted to use a combination ofwar games
and closed formmodels to take advantage of the
best features of eachwhile ignoring the worst. So
we had a model almost identical to JANUS—
from the same people who did JANUS. I had
something like 30 odd terminals, where in those
days you maybe got two to work at once and
30 odd ladies—that was part of the ‘‘root canal,’’
I’d have all these personnel problems and I am
not equipped for personnel problems.
Colonel Gary Anderson had the role of the
Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Commander.
And we’d run the war game until we got it to
a decision point. We’d take the decisions that
came out of that, put them into decision tables
in the closed form model, run that until it got
to another decision point, take it back and run
it in the war game.
And we came up with a situation where if
you had the MV-22 you won hands down and
if you didn’t have it, you lost. That was just
the one instance though. It turned out because
you could close a gap and trap two armies. This
had to be done totally in the open. Throughout
the process, I had observers from OSD, the
Army and the Air Force.
So we did it and the Assistant Secretary of
the Navy (Research, Development, and Acqui-
sition) [ASN RD&A] Ms. Nora Slatkin—after
we completed all this—said, ‘‘isn’t it ironic that
the whole future of the Marine Corps depends
on a town nobody heard of.’’ But that’s how it
worked. That’s what we had to do at this point.
That’s an example of what I was talking about in
terms of defensive analysis. If PA&E had model
runs during their internal analyses that showed
that there was value in the MV-22, they proba-
bly would have never told us about them.
Steve Stephens: What support was provided
and how did it come about that you provided
the support from Studies and Analysis in the
early 1990s to the Desert Storm operation?
Al Brandstein: How it came about was that
Quantico wanted to participate as best they could
and at the very start of Desert Storm, and along
came Marty Steele.
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Steve Stephens: General Martin Steele. He
was a colonel then, wasn’t he?
Al Brandstein: He was a colonel. He arrived
within two or three days of the invasion of
Kuwait. Not knowing any better, he enlisted
my help. If he had been around for a while he
wouldn’t have. We were in charge of working
out a plan of what would be happening about
six months from that point. And that’s really
the start. Colonel Mark Cancian arrived. He
had studiedwhat theNaval Postgraduate School
had done in the 1973 war. That was when they
sent people out poking pencils in the holes in
tanks and coming up with a cardioid distri-
bution. Marty Steele andMark Cancianwanted
to do that same sort of thing. So we organized
teams to go over there. It was hard to get them
into the theater, at least initially. And we also
had started when General Gray was there—the
lessons learned system.
Going back a few years, General Gray was
the Commandant of the Marine Corps. And
we, back in Quantico, had lots of commitments
to him that we met except for the lessons
learned system he had asked for.
We pretty much ignored the lessons learned
system, hoping the Commandant would forget
about it. We didn’t knowwhat a lessons learned
system was. We did not know how to go about
getting one and we certainly didn’t have any
funding for it, even if we knew what it was.
But he called, very irately one day and wanted
to know where his lessons learned system was.
So we took the next guy who came through the
door—of those coming through the door, we
took the one with the highest GCT (General
Competency Test) score. This happened to be
Major Gary Brisbois. We said, ‘‘The Comman-
dant wants this lessons learned system. Get
one for him. Unfortunately, we don’t have any
assets or money and we don’t know what one
is. But do it.’’
And Gary did it. Not only did he do that,
which became the sample for all the other Ser-
vices’ lessons learned systems, he also devel-
oped a remedial action program. So then along
comes Desert Shield and Storm and this gave
us the entry into the theatre because we sent
teams over to teach people how to use the les-
sons learned system and then together with
Mark Cancian’s initial efforts, we sent people
over to collect data. They wanted a sophisti-
cated name for it and unfortunately the best
I could think of was MCOAAG, Marine Corps
Operations Analysis and Assessment Group.
[Note: MCOAG was a CNA organization.
MCOAAG was a Marine Corps temporary
organization.]
We then had about 250 people in Studies
and Analysis with the Reserves that had been
called up. We hot seated it around the clock,
running a 24-hour operation. In addition to
having teams over there, we had support back
here. In part logistics consisted of sending Girl
Scout cookies over. We had two airplanes at
our disposal and we would trade riding in
the airplanes and Girl Scout cookies for data.
It worked.
Steve Stephens: What kind of airplanes did
you have?
Al Brandstein: C-12. Small ones, not the big
ones. One reasonwewere so effective is because
we had reserves who, as civilians, worked in the
State Department. So they knew all the ropes.
Whom to call, what to do, and we managed
everything with two telephones in the office.
The leader of the team over there was Colo-
nel Cliff Stanley. Gary Brisbois had, in the in-
terim, retired from the Marine Corps. So he
was hired back as a contractor, and he worked
for Potomac Research, or some company like
that, to go through the data, organize it, and de-
fine lessons learned. That was our involvement.
I was in charge of the Marine Corps report
to Congress on this that got sanitized a little
bit. I found it interesting because we had to
make deals. We knew things about some of the
Services we weren’t sure Congress would ap-
preciate and other Services knew things about
us that we were sure Congress wouldn’t appre-
ciate and we did a lot of horse trading to make
sure that neither side was terribly embarrassed.
Subsequent to this came all the horrors from
the General Accounting Office, the Washington
Post, Greenpeace, et al. They all wanted to know
what was in the lessons learned system from the
war.
Steve Stephens: I think at the time I heard
something about a fight over freedom of
information?
Al Brandstein: Yes, there were Freedom of
Information Act inquiries and we said that this
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was predecisional data, was not subject to the
Freedom of Information Act and this went back
and forth. If I had anything that these people
were looking for, I would have given it to them
immediately but I didn’t have anything and
they didn’t believe it.
Steve Stephens:Howdid Project Albert start?
Al Brandstein: My recollection is not the
same as Dr. Gary Horne’s. I don’t know which
one’s right. I’m just going to tell you what I re-
call. General Van Riper, before coming to Quan-
tico, had been exposed to something he called
‘‘new sciences.’’ He was very enthused about
it. So he sentme off to go to the Santa Fe Institute
where they were doing that sort of thing.
I went off kicking and screaming for two
reasons: one, I had just read the Scientific Amer-
ican article on the Institute; and two, I was, as
a mathematician and OR analyst, basically
a reductionist, that is breaking things down to
pieces, and this was anathema to that. I didn’t
have much choice.
So I went off there and I felt most of the stuff
they were doing was pedantic nonsense. Never-
theless, therewere some valuable nuggets. They
were studying systems that were not amenable
to traditional analysis and they seemed to have
some approaches that might make a dent in it.
So I became a semi-enthusiast, especially since
General Van Riper kept hittingme over the head
with it. And that’s how we got involved with
complexity and that sort of thing.
Then, General Van Riper went around giv-
ing talks haranguing against the mechanistic
world of Isaac Newton. One day he couldn’t
make a talk, so I went up to a think tank in
Washington, I think it was CIS (Center for Inter-
national Studies). I talked a little bit about what
we were up to and complexity and maybe my
usual topic about why traditional analysis
doesn’t work on most problems.
A gentlemen from CIS came up to me and
said he was friendly with Senator Inouye’s prin-
cipal staffer and was pretty sure that if we
could find some way to legitimately use the
high-performance computers inMaui, the Sena-
tor would see to it that we got funded for it and
there was enough left over to do our research.
So we sat down, and this is the part where
my memory and Gary’s are different—but I’m
giving you my side and I can’t say for sure that
it’s correct. So we sat down there and came up
with this eight-year plan and budget and with
goals and milestones and all this done in a half
hour. That budget has come through every year
just the way we described it and the milestones
have been met, actually. So that’s the origin of
Project Albert.
Then back to Isaac Newton. About 10% of
CNA’s time was devoted to the Marine Corps.
Dr. George Akst, who worked there at the time,
put us in contact with a new PhD they had,
Andy Ilachinski, who had a PhD in something
like this.
So we asked him to try to create one of the
models like they were using at the Santa Fe In-
stitute, cellular automata models, and make
one that could apply to warfare. The result was
ISAAC (Irreducible Semi-Autonomous Adap-
tive Combat), the first of these models. It was
named ISAAC partly because it was an acronym
butmainly becauseGeneral VanRiper didn’t like
Isaac Newton’s mechanistic world.
Some of the people at CNA are a little bit
different. Usually the good guys were blue and
the bad guys were red. Andy reversed that in
ISAAC, so the good guys were red and the bad
guys were blue. That was, I think, because of
Andy’s Slovak heritage.We quickly changed that
to make the good guys blue and the bad guys
red. Anyway, this became the first of these things
that was a proof of concept of where the cellular
automata that were moved could be used to
study some of the emergent issues in warfare.
So that was the first of these models and sort of
perpetuated itself.
Gary Horne who was then at CNA eventu-
ally moved to MITRE. And at the time, Gary
Brisboiswas running theMITRE office inWood-
bridge, near Quantico, and he provided a very
fertile environment for fostering this stuff.
Steve Stephens: You’ve been accused of nam-
ing all your models after dead mathematicians.
Al Brandstein: That’s right. I’ve tried to.
There’s Archimedes, which was technically
a success but a failure in terms of utility. Because
I wanted a fuzzy logic approach and we got the
fuzzy calculus in there and it’s a rigorous calcu-
lus. Our developers, however, were physicists
and couldn’t relate to mere mortals.
Thenwehad Pythagoras, which gets enough
of the fuzzy logic in there to make it useful but is
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alsomuchmore utilitarian and easier to use.And
there’s Socrates. I’m not sure he’s a mathemati-
cian, well, you could say he was.
Andwhat else didwe have?Gauss. Gauss is
not amodel but it was a way of trying to convert
things from one level of resolution to another
one,more or less automatically. And thenAlbert
is the name; Project Albert comes from Albert
Einstein. Now that we had things like ISAAC,
the natural question is, if you had such a thing
what in the world do you do with it? The mod-
eling is the trivial part. It’s how in the world do
you use that to guide decision-making. And the
intellectual successor of Isaac Newton was
Albert Einstein. Hence the name.
Steve Stephens: Could you say a few words
about the process of distillation?
Al Brandstein: It fits into a larger context. I
have harangued against theVV&Aprocess that’s
used in most combat models. That is, you have
volumes full of information about algorithms,
and then you have volumes about how they’re
put into code; and the result of those two is sup-
posed to support accreditation. In my mind, ac-
creditation is a decision maker saying, ‘‘Yes this
model is appropriate to use to answer this ques-
tion.’’ Unless you have decision makers who are
far smarter than I—and there are some, espe-
cially some generals—but the normal decision
maker is not.
Verification and validation contribute noth-
ing to the decision maker’s ability to assess
whether this is the rightmodel to use for deciding
the future of the Marine Corps. The idea behind
distillations was to start out with accreditation
first. What does this guy or lady think is impor-
tant about the situation? Attempting to distill that
into as simple a format as possible, have that
person verify that, yes, we are reflecting his
thoughts and, yes, when I see something unex-
pected coming out of there it’s not an anomaly
of the model but something that really should
have happened—my intuition was not suffi-
cient at the time, but now I’ve learned.
So that’s where I see the role of accreditation
and distillation are two different facets of the
same concept. I also see distillation as a means
of coming up with tools to help accredit more
sophisticated models when the need arises. I
see that things like JWARS (Joint Warfare Sys-
tem) could be accredited by distilling what’s
in there. Making sure that the people who have
some experience with this stuff see that the in-
teractions are the way they’re supposed to be
and then let JWARS worry about the details.
Steve Stephens: But if that’s true, when you
put them all together will the final data still give
the proper expected answers?
Al Brandstein:You get a choice. If you are us-
ing an unaccredited model, a model that you
can’t understand, you should have very little
confidence that the answers are right. If you
do this combination of stuff at least you have
some confidence that when I do JWARS for the
details, or whatever model, that it’s roughly
reflecting what it should have been.
The other option is you go through, you
bring in some differential equations and some
line of sight calculations to the general. That
doesn’t help him any in accrediting the thing,
or he could ask me. Now why in the world
would I be involved in accrediting by saying,
‘‘Yes, this model is appropriate for determining
the future of the Marine Corps.’’
Steve Stephens: I have been involved inmany
similar discussions and it has been stated that
the type of modeling to do has come to a water-
shed.
Al Brandstein: Awatershed good or bad?
Steve Stephens: A watershed inasmuch as
we’ve done as much as we can with end-to-end
campaign-level simulations, and we’ve got to
do something else. Do you agree with that and
if you do what else should be done?
Al Brandstein:Oh, definitely. You have to do
something else. I harken back and my inspira-
tion for this is a National Academy of Sciences
report, ‘‘Making the Nation Safer 2004.’’ In there
it talks about complex systems and what the
role of modeling is with respect to conflicts and
complex systems. Theymay have a technical def-
inition of it, but a complex system, inmymind, is
anything where nonlinearities can occur. People
are involved in some sort of decision making in
there. These people can sometimes make mis-
takes or be geniuses and there is nonlinearity
and the co-evolution. That is, very rarely will
people make decisions against an adversary
without taking into account what they think
the adversary is thinking.
Now all of those are major components of
what I think happens in warfare. Unless you
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can take them into account, you’re remiss. The
old approach was to put more and more details
into modeling. That’s great but I think counter-
productive—depending onwhat the purpose is.
If the purpose is to decide on force structure or
whether one tactic or strategy is better than an-
other one, I think it’s going the wrong direction.
Because if they’re sensitive to the location of
a tree or a rock or the name of the third lance cor-
poral in the fifth squad, then the things they are
sensitive to vary over such a large range that it
becomes impossible given the age of the uni-
verse to sample in enough detail to determine
whether we should have four divisions or five
divisions or whether the Army should be elim-
inated or not. They may be good for things. If
you want to get a sample of what could possibly
have happened, you need a model like this.
Now let’s go back to situations where there’s
co-evolution and nonlinearities and that sort of
thing.What does itmean to do analysis on those?
That’s where the National Academy of Science
helps out. That I may have played some role
in helping them help it out but that’s neither
here nor there. They said for systems like that,
it is not appropriate to make predictions. What
is appropriate is to look for processes and de-
termine what processes could have led to an
outcome. And that’s exactly what the kind of
modeling I’m doing tends to contribute. It looks
at processes.
I’m doing things now for the Border Patrol
and we see wide ranges in outcomes and then
we ask ourselves why that happened. We go
back and look at the models and see—we keep
the random number generator—andwatchwhat
happens. Remember the models we’re using are
credible in that I have gotten together with the
people in the Border Patrol and understand
Border Patrol and I am representing this cor-
rectly; after we look at it, could such and such
happen?My rules for accreditation should be just
two simple ones. Is anything that came out of
that, any result of the model, impossible to have
happened? And number two, can you think of
an event that the model couldn’t recreate? Statis-
tics seems to fall apart with this stuff and maybe
it’s because in my naivete´ or lack of knowledge
about statistics, I don’t know how to sample. If
you’re going to make predictions, you’re going
to have to come up with some samples.
What we can do is to explore which pro-
cesses occur, what kind of things can happen.
This also leads to my definition of command
and control, what the appropriate use of com-
mand and control is. And then one of the things
the current models are using—well I just real-
ized this a couple of days ago—are actually
good at that. The purpose of command and con-
trol is to recognize when things are not going as
anticipated. Recognize not going the way you
want them and then take the appropriate action
to fix it. These models, and by looking at pro-
cesses, can show when things are going bad
and then allow you to take some actions and
see which, if any, of these could be beneficial
or make things worse.
That’s simple and you can pick up a guy in
MANA and put him down over here and see if
that makes a difference. I am not necessarily
proposing that the data farming is the be all
and end all. It is useful for identifying certain re-
gions, but I think you also need to take this ap-
proach, once you see something happening is
there some way you can interpose command
and control to cause it not to happen the way
it’s going to—that’s my view of command and
control. Fortunately, nowadays I get to work
on problems where there is no modeling infra-
structure. In DoD you have billions of dollars
invested in all these glorious models. They are
probably good for some things. I’m not sure
what, but I’m sure there are uses for them.
JWARS, TACWAR, JSIMS—unfortunately went
away, and that sort of thing. The Border Patrol
has nothing. So it’s a fertile ground for exploring
and understanding what’s going on and to help
out the decision maker.
Steve Stephens: Two questions—why use
agent-based models if you can’t validate them,
and why use traditional models if you can’t ac-
credit them?
Al Brandstein: I have spent the last twenty
years trying to resolve this dichotomy. That is
what Operational Synthesis is all about: merg-
ing the various approaches so as to arrive at
meaningful answers to questions. Fortunately,
MITRE has encouraged the refinement of this
process as well as the application to some im-
portant, non-DoD questions.
Steve Stephens: Do you find yourself work-
ing now almost exclusively outside of DoD?
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Al Brandstein: Yes. That’s mainly because
I’m in an organization that works entirely out-
side of DoD. There are two reasons for it. When
I went to work at MITRE, I did not want to be
involved with any funding or influence that
could be traced back in any way to Project
Albert. That meant getting out of DoD. But I’m
in such an organization, my primary things
nowadays are problems for the Border Patrol,
Center for Disease Control—there they have a
lot of models but they don’t know how to use
the models to support the right decisions and
I’m trying to fix that. And the Coast Guard—I
did some reviewing of what they’re modeling
regularly and I’m advocating, though they
haven’t approved it yet, that we use this agent-
based approach to Border Patrol to expand that
to protecting all the nation’s boundaries.
Steve Stephens: Sounds like it fits right into
homeland defense.
Al Brandstein: Oh, yes.
Steve Stephens: What have you found to be
the differences between operations research
within DoD and operations research outside
DoD?
Al Brandstein: I hesitate to say. In the Depart-
ment of Defense, operations research is used to
justify decisions that have already been made.
Outside, they actually think that it might be use-
ful to some degree. And that’s being somewhat
negative, but I think more often than not, that’s
the case. Kabuki dance comes to mind.
Steve Stephens: Kabuki dance?
Al Brandstein: Yes, in DoD.
Steve Stephens: I don’t follow that.
Al Brandstein: The more important the deci-
sion is, it’s always been my thought—for minor
decisions OR works great. The more important
the decision is, the less a role that OR’s going to
play in that decision. And just think of any of
the major decisions that have been made within
the Defense Department, the Joint Staff, or what-
ever, in the last 10, 20 years. More important—
take net centric warfare for instance. There’s
no analysis—maybe it’s a great concept, maybe
it’s not. After the concept they came along and
started doing modeling stuff. You name it, the
higher the level military decision was, the less
likely that OR plays a role. You want to know
something about the logistics trade and how
they get things quicker or faster from one place
to another, then you use OR. I shouldn’t be so
cynical.
Steve Stephens: I have heard that one pri-
mary difference is the fact that within the De-
partment of Defense you don’t have the profit
there. You don’t have that bottom line.
Al Brandstein: I’mworking for other govern-
ment agencies. The for-profit world was not one
that I could fit into. I tried it for a while.
Steve Stephens: So within the government
but not within DoD.
Al Brandstein: Exactly. The part of MITRE
that I worked for—Center for Enterprise
Modernization—only works for government
agencies.
Steve Stephens: From your viewpoint what is
the state—state of the union as it were—of the
operations research profession in the United
States?
Al Brandstein: In the United States, DoD is
becoming more and more stylized. Outside of
DoD it seems to be prospering. For instance, look
at the FAA or you look at electrical distribution
and you look at the topics that we are currently
involved with, I see at least the stature of OR in-
creasing in areas and parts of the government
outside DoD. Now this is again a biased, cynical
view. I’ve been too much involved in making
sausage within the DoD framework.
You see it also when you go to professional
meetings. Lots of people in OR. It’s a blooming
field. Less and less of them are going to DoD
OR. And that’s something to worry about.
Steve Stephens: The multidisciplinary
approach—the hallmark of the early days –of
OR and the curricular approach where we have
an OR curriculum. What are the advantages
and disadvantages of each and which direction
do you think we should be going?
Al Brandstein: Definitely multidisciplinary.
If you have enough background and especially
math and it used to be in physics though I don’t
think you need physics so much anymore and
here I’ll go off in a tangent again. OR modeling
often, lately, and maybe, over the last couple of
years, has suffered from physics envy. You have
to have physics around. You’ve got to get the
physics right. The physics—if you got the phys-
ics wrong it’s bad; you’ll never get it V&V’d.
But most of the things that are happening
are not physics based. Physics can tell whether
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a bullet will strike a target but has little to do
with the actual decision to fire. Morale, on the
other hand is one of the things that are most im-
portant. You need math. That’s clear. And you
need to have a liberal arts education perhaps
in order to think.
You may have one or two OR courses, but if
you have the math you can pick up the rest. If
you don’t have the sociology background or hu-
man psychology background or at least know
what’s going on in those fields, it’s much more
difficult to pick up. That’s the way our OR fore-
fathers were.
Steve Stephens:What would you offer as ad-
vice to a young person entering DoD operations
research either wearing a uniform or not wear-
ing a uniform?
Al Brandstein: I’d say get a PhD in some-
thing other than operations research—that, by
the way, seems to be CNA style. A PhD’s not
good for anything except it’s a guarantee or
semiguarantee that you can do some thinking.
I think that’s what CNA is about. They hire peo-
ple with proven thinking abilities. You’re prob-
ably better off not having the OR background
and then learning it on the job.
Because of the famous story, that is, three
guys go in for a job interview and it’s only one
question. Howmuch is one plus one? Themath-
ematician comes in and his answer is ‘‘Two.’’
Engineer—‘‘To how many significant digits
would you like the answer?’’ And the OR per-
son goes on in, closes the door, closes the blinds,
goes up and whispers, ‘‘How much would you
like it to be?’’ Now that’s more andmore becom-
ing the reputation of OR within the defense
community. We need to change that reputation.
Remember, we go back to defensive analy-
sis. I thought, more than half the time, that the
models used were irrelevant. If you’re clever
enough you can come up with a scenario and
tweak the algorithms in the model to give you
the answer you want. And you have to be; if
you’re cleverer you can do it so that other peo-
ple don’t recognize it, and that too often is the
way analysis within the DoD works.
I’ve advocated for Quadrennial Defense Re-
views (QDRs) in the past and they, of course,
laughed me out of the building—that the Marine
Corps do the analysis of where the Air Force
should be going. The Navy does the Army’s
and theArmydoes theMarineCorps’. Alsowhat
I’ve advocated for mission area analysis, you
want infantry say done by the artillery commu-
nity and the artillery folks ormaybe logistics peo-
ple do the role of what infantry should do. Then
you get the flavor of what you want that service,
that particular part of the service to do, presum-
ing everybody’s patriots. We’re not going to go
too far off. I need artillery to do this, this and this
for me. The infantry or the logistics people are
saying that. They laughedme out of the building.
And one of the things I got most laughed at, was
when I used to be on the board of JWARS.
I was on the analysis counsel and the JWARS
steering committee and the executive—you
name it, I was on it. Namely because I was, at
least certain parts of the time, if it had more than
one syllable in it, I was directed to do it. I was just
the only one around. Not that I had any capabil-
ities. Sowhat I advocated for JWARSwas the fol-
lowing. Remove all classifications, and then
distribute it as widely as possible throughout
theworld. If the U.S. is really as good aswe think
we are—let them do the analysis and prove to
themselves that they can’t win a war. The only
ones left are going to be the lunatics, but you’d
have that anyway.
But then we got the Marine officers who
came out of Naval Postgraduate School who
did, say, their thesis on Markov chains or some
sort. They divided questions into two cate-
gories: Markov chains or insolvable. What I’ve
advocated in schools and I think it’s something
that should be taught is something I’ve named,
for want of a better name, meta-analysis. This
would be a series of case studies on what were
the various analytical problems in the defense
community, what was the approach used, why
they picked that approach, what was wrong
with it and what would have happened if they
would have used a different approach.
I think that should be a required course of
theory. I tried to get it instituted at the Postgrad-
uate School and they, at the time, said they
didn’t have the staff to teach it. So I offered to
go out and get a couple of seminars and have
other people do them as well.
You need to have a broad background and
various techniques rather than an in-depth
knowledge of any one. You can always look
them up in the book of rules.
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